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TEMPORAL  RESOLUTION  OF  UNCERTAINTY  AND  DYNAMIC 
CHOICE  THEORY 
BY  DAVID  M. KREPS  AND  EVAN  L.  PORTEUS' 
We consider dynamic choice behavior under conditions of uncertainty, with emphasis on 
the  timing  of  the  resolution  of  uncertainty.  Choice  behavior  in  which  an  individual 
distinguishes between  lotteries based on the times at which their uncertainty resolves is 
axiomatized  and represented,  thus the  result is choice  behavior which cannot be  rep- 
resented by a single cardinal utility function on the vector of payoffs. Both descriptive and 
normative treatments of the problem are given and are shown to be equivalent. Various 
specializations are provided, including an extension of "separable" utility and representa- 
tion by a single cardinal utility function. 
CONSIDER THE  FOLLOWING idealization of a dynamic choice problem with 
uncertainty. At  each in a finite, discrete sequence  of times t = 0,  1, . . .,  T, an 
individual  must choose an action d,. His choice is constrained  by what we 
temporarily  call the state at time t, xt. Then some random  event takes place, 
determining  an immediate  payoff  zt  to the individual  and the next state xt+l.  The 
probability  distribution  of the pair (zt,  xt+l)  is determined  by the action dt. 
The standard  approach  in analyzing  this  problem,  which  we will call the payoff 
vector  approach,  assumes  that  the individual's  choice  behavior  is representable  as 
follows: He has a von Neumann-Morgenstern  utility  function U defined  on the 
vector  of payoffs (z0, z1, . . .,  ZT).  Each strategy  (which  is a contingent  plan for 
choosing  actions  given states)  induces  a probability  distribution  on the vector of 
payoffs. So the individual's  choice of action is that specified by any optimal 
strategy, any strategy which maximizes the expectation of utility among all 
strategies  (assuming  sufficient  conditions  so that an optimal  strategy  exists). 
This paper presents an axiomatic  treatment  of the dynamic  choice problem 
which is more general than the payoff vector approach,  but which still permits 
tractable  analysis.  The fundamental  difference  between our treatment  and the 
payoff  vector approach  lies in our treatment  of the temporal  resolution  of uncer- 
tainty:  In our models,  uncertainty  is "dated"  by the time of its resolution,  and  the 
individual  regards  uncertainties  resolving  at different  times  as being  different.  For 
example,  consider  a situation  in which a fair coin is to be flipped.  If it comes up 
heads, the payoff  vector will be (zo,  z1)  = (5, 10); if it is tails, the vector will be 
(5, 0). Because  z0 = 5 in either  case, the coin flip  can  take  place at either  time 0 or 
time 1. It will not matter  when the flip  occurs  to someone who has cardinal  utility 
on the vector  of payoffs.  But an individual  can obey our axioms  and  prefer  either 
one to the other. 
One justification  for our approach  is the well known "timeless-temporal"  or 
"joint time-risk"  feature of some models (usually  models which are not "com- 
plete"). For example, preferences  on income streams  which are induced  from 
primitive  preferences  on consumption  streams  in general  depend  upon when the 
1 The authors gratefully acknowledge the comments and suggestions of Professors J. M. Harrison 
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uncertainty  concerning  future  income  resolves (see Spence  and Zeckhauser  [9]). 
Our treatment  gives a framework  within which such effects can be modeled, 
without  overburdening  the model with the detail of the primitive  preferences.2 
The second (and, we believe, the more important)  justification  is that the 
relevance  of the time of resolution  arises naturally  in a dynamic  choice setting. 
Following work on the theory of  dynamic choice under certainty, such as 
Hammond  [3] and Peleg and Yaari [6], we first  consider  the individual's  choice 
behavior  at each distinct  time and then we consider  how his choice behavior  at 
different  times is related. At a single time, the individual  chooses from among 
actions,  identified  as probability  distributions  on immediate  payoff  and  next state 
pairs,  and  we assume  standard  axioms  which  make  these choices  representable  by 
a cardinal  utility  function  on such pairs.  Then a "temporal  consistency"  axiom  is 
given which knits together these representations:  The result is a preference 
structure  in which  the time of resolution  may be relevant. 
This approach,  essentially  descriptive,  is developed  in Sections 1, 2, and 3. In 
Section 1, formal definitions  and constructions  of dynamic choice problems, 
states, and actions are given both mathematically  and diagrammatically  (as 
decision  trees).  Axioms  and  results  for  choice  behavior  at a single  time  are  given  in 
Section 2. We rely on standard  theories of cardinal  utility (especially  Fishburn 
[1]), so details and proofs are omitted. Section  3 presents  the "temporal  consis- 
tency"  axiom and its consequences  for representation  of choice behavior.  Also, 
the complete  representation  theorem  is illustrated  by a simple  example. 
An alternative  approach  to preferences  in dynamic  choice  problems,  equivalent 
to that given in Sections 1, 2, and 3, is developed in Section 4. This is a more 
normative  approach  which  clarifies  the issue  of temporal  resolution  of uncertainty 
and provides an easy comparison  with the payoff vector approach.  Taken as 
primitive are the individual's preferences among objects called temporal  lotteries, 
from which choices in dynamic  choice problems  are derived. This formulation 
parallels  the payoff  vector  approach,  where  preferences  on lotteries  are  primitive 
and dynamic  choices  are induced.  Thus  the difference  between  the two is seen to 
lie in the definition  of a temporal  lottery,  which  formalizes  the temporal  aspect  of 
uncertainty. 
In Section 5, we examine the consequences  of assuming  that the individual 
prefers  earlier  resolution  of uncertainty  to later  or vice versa.  Then we show that 
our approach  is equivalent to the payoff vector approach  if and only if the 
individual  is indifferent  to the time of resolution. 
In our treatment,  choice behavior  at time t is allowed  to depend  on the payoffs 
received up to time t (zo, e *  *, zt-  ).  The consequences  of assuming  that time t 
choices are independent of previous payoffs are discussed in Section 6, and 
comparisons  are made with similar  separability  assumptions  in the payoff  vector 
approach. 
2 Briefly,  the issue can be illustrated  as follows. If in the example  the coin flip determines  your 
income  for  the next  two  years,  you  probably  prefer  to have  the coin  flipped  now,  so that  you are  better 
able to budget  your  income  for consumption  purposes.  In later  work  we will explore  the connection 
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We conclude in Section 7 with some miscellaneous  discussion.  In particular, 
relaxation  of the "temporal  consistency"  axiom  (in  the spirit  of Hammond  [3] and 
Peleg and Yaari [6]) is touched  upon. 
Work similar to that presented here, concerning  preferences for "certain- 
uncertain"  pairs,  has been done independently  by Selden [8]. 
To keep mathematical  detail to a minimum,  standard  proofs are often just 
sketched and sometimes omitted, and the axioms employed (particularly  our 
continuity  axiom)  are stronger  than is strictly  necessary  (but  see Section 7). 
Much of the content of this study lies in the definitions  of dynamic  choice 
problems  and  temporal  lotteries-objects which  allow  us to "date"  uncertainty  by 
the time of  its resolution. The reader is forewarned that the mathematical 
definitions  of these objects  are quite  complex.  The diagrammatic  representations 
(as  decision  trees and  probability  trees)  which  follow  the mathematical  definitions 
should  be read together  with the mathematics. 
1.  MATHEMATICAL  AND  DIAGRAMMATIC  REPRESENTATION 
We assume  given  a finite  integer  T and,  for each time  t (t  ,  0, 1  ... .,  T), a set Z, 
of possible payoffs.  We assume  that each Z, is a compact  Polish (i.e., complete 
separable  metric)  space.  A generic  element  of Z, is denoted  by  z,. Let Y1  = Zo and, 
for t=2,...,  T+1,  let  Yt= Yt- 1xZt-1. The set Yt is called the set of payoff 
histories up to (but not including) time t, with generic element y, = (zo, ..  .,  zt-1). 
Note  that YT+1 is the set of complete payoff vectors. For k < t,  Zk(yt) and Yk(Yt) 
will denote the projections  onto Zk  and Yk,  respectively. 
Next, let DT be the set of Borel probability  measures  on ZT,  endowed  with  the 
Prohorov  metric  (the metric  of weak  convergence),  and,  recursively,  let Xt be the 
set of nonempty  closed subsets  of Dt, endowed  with  the Hausdorff  metric,  and  let 
Dt-1  be the set of Borel probability  measures  on Zt-  x Xt, endowed with the 
Prohorov  metric.  These constructions  are possible  because  of the following  two 
results  from analysis. 
LEMMA  1:  If Z  and X  are compact Polish spaces and D  is the set of Borel 
probability  measures on Z x X, then D is a compact Polish space under the Prohorov 
metric (cf. Parthasarathy [5, Ch. 2, especially Theorems 6.2 and 6.4]). 
LEMMA  2:  If D  is a compact Polish space and X is the set of nonempty closed 
subsets of D,  then X  is a compact Polish space under the Hausdorff metric (cf. 
Kuratowski [4]). 
(For  notational  convenience,  we sometimes  will  write Yt and Yt  when t = 0 and 
Xt+1 and xt+l when t =  T. In such cases,  YO  and XT+1 may be thought of as any 
convenient  singleton sets, and DT as the set of Borel probability  measures  on 
ZT  X XT+1.) 
DEFINITIONS:  A  dynamic choice problem (over {Zt}) from time t to  T is any 
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Recall the description  given at the beginning  of the paper. At each time t, the 
individual  chooses an action,  constrained  by what  we called  the state. The action 
chosen determines  a probability  distribution  over the next payoff-state  pair. In 
formalizing  these notions,  we simply  define  an action  as the probability  distribu- 
tion itself.  And the term  "state"  is replaced  by "choice  problem",  which  is defined 
as a closed set of actions.  (In the standard  teminology  of dynamic  programming, 
something  like D,(x,) is used to denote the set of actions  feasible  at state x,. Here, 
in contrast,  x, itself is that set.) 
Our constructions  can be represented diagrammatically  by decision trees. 
Suppose  T= 1 and  Zo = Z, = [0, 10]. The space  D1, the space  of actions  at time 1, 
is the space of probability  distributions  on Z1. Diagrammatically,  d1  eD1  is a 
chance  node (depicted  by a circle)  with  outcomes  in ZA.  For  example,  one element 
in D1, called di(a), a .6 chance  at 2 and a .4 chance  at 6, is drawn  as in Figure  1. 
(Edi(0)[U3] 
32.542)  54(U(3,2) 
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(Ignore the expressions and numbers in the parentheses in Figure 1. These 
illustrate  concepts  developed  later.)  Another  element  of D1, called  d1(b)  and  also 
drawn  in Figure 1, is a .7 chance  at 1 and a .3 chance  at 10. 
Elements  of X1, decision  problems  commencing  at time 1, are  nonempty  closed 
subsets of D. For example, x1(a)  = {d1(a),  d1(b)}  is in X1 and is depicted as in 
Figure 1. 
Elements  of Do are probability  distributions  on Zo  X X1. One example  is do(a) 
as depicted in Figure 1: This represents  equal chances at prizes (3, x1(a)) and 
(4, xi(b)). Finally, an element x0 from Xo is drawn as shown. In all of these 
drawings,  we have depicted  only probability  distributions  with  finite  supports  and 
closed  subsets  which  are finite.  More  general  cases  are  clearly  encompassed  in our 
mathematical  framework. 
Notational  conventions  which  we employ  include  the following:  For z, E Zt and 
xt+1  E Xt+1,  the distribution in Dt which is degenerate at (zt, xt+,) is denoted simply 
by (zt, xt+,).  Given dt E Dt, we write dt E Xt in place of {dt}  E Xt  for the (closed) 
subset  of Dt which  contains  the single  element dt.  Combining  these, we can  write 
(zt, dt+1)  for both the element of Dt which is degenerate at (zt, dt+1)  E Zt x Xt+l  and 
for  the  singleton  set  it  forms  (in  Xt).  Continuing in  this  fashion, 
(zt, Zt+i,  * ..  ,  Zk,  Xk+J)  will  denote the action  at time t (element  of D,) which  yields, 
with certainty and without any intervening  (nontrivial)  choice, payoffs z; for 
j =  t, . . .,  k and the choice problem Xk+1  at time k + 1. It also denotes the singleton 
set that this action  forms. 
Each  set Dt is a mixture  space:  For a E [0, 1] and d, d' E Dt, there  is an element 
in Dt which  "is"  d with probability  a and d' with  probability  1-  a. Let (a; d, d') 
denote this element.3 
For each real valued bounded measurable function f on Zt x Xt+l  and for each 
d E Dt, the integral  of f with respect  to the measure  d is denoted by Ed [f]. 
2.  CHOICE  BEHAVIOR  AT  A  POINT  IN  TIME 
At time t, the individual  chooses  from  a (nonempty  closed)  subset  of Dt. That  is, 
he faces  a dynamic  choice  problem  xt and  must  choose a member  of xt.  His choices 
are allowed  to depend  on the history  of previous  payoffs,  yt,  and  are  assumed  to be 
consistent  in the following  sense. 
AXIoM  2.1: For  each t and Yt,  the  individual's  choices  from  closed  subsets  of Dt 
are representable  by a complete  and transitive  binary  relation  >Yt  on Dt. 
Note that the individual's  choice behavior  is assumed  to be independent  of the 
dynamic choice problem he is facing; we do not write >Yt,Xt, This constitutes an 
assumption  of "independence  of irrelevant  alternatives".  The induced  indiffer- 
ence and strict  preference  relations  are denoted by  -Yt  and >Yt'  respectively. 
3Formally,  for A a Borel measurable subset of Zt x Xt+?,  the measure assigned by (a; d, d') to A is 
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AXIOM  2.2 (Continuity):  For  each t and yt,  >y  is continuous.4 
This  axiom  is stronger  than  necessary  for our  eventual  objectives,  but  it is made  to 
keep mathematical  detail  from  dominating  the exposition:  It partially  justifies  the 
restriction  of our attention to closed subsets of Dt, because with continuous 
preferences,  an  individual  may  be assumed  to be indifferent  between  any  subset  of 
actions  and the closure  of that subset (but  see footnote 5). 
AXIoM  2.3 (Substitution):  For  each t and Yt,  if d, d' E  D, are  such that  d >  y  d', 
then (a; d, d")  >Yt (a; d', d")  for all a E (0, 1) and for all d"  e D,. 
These three axioms  are sufficient  to allow the application  of the machinery  of 
cardinal  utility  theory (see, e.g., Fishburn  [1, Theorem 10.1]). 
LEMMA  3: Axioms 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 are necessary  and sufficient  for there  to 
exist,  for each yt,  a (bounded)  continuous  function  Uy,: Z, x X+1 ->  R such that  for 
d, d'  E Dt, d > Yt  d' if and only if Ed[ Uyt]  3Ed[ Uyt]. 
The proof  is omitted,  but note that  in the necessity  half,  continuity  of the Uy,  will 
give Axiom 2.2. The functions  Uyt  are, of course, unique  up to a positive affine 
transformation. 
The  function  Uyt  can  be extended  to Dt by defining  Uyt(d)  = Ed[Uyt]  and  then  to 
Xt by defining  Uy,(x)  = maxdEX  Uy,(d).  Because  x is compact  and Uy,  is continuous 
on Dt, the maximum  is attained.  The extension to Dt makes Uy,  a (continuous) 
representation  of  >yt,  and the extension to Xt makes Uyt a  (continuous) 
representation  of the extension  of >yt to X, by the rule:  x >yt x' if for each d' E x' 
there exists a d e x  such that d >Yt  d'. Using the compactness  of x, we can 
alternatively  define:  x  Yt X'  if there exists d E x such  that for all d'e x', d >  Yt d  '. 
Note  that  Yt extended to  Xt  in this manner is complete, transitive, and 
continuous.5 
3.  TEMPORAL  CONSISTENCY  AND  THE  REPRESENTATION  THEOREM 
Preferences  at different  times are tied together  by the following. 
AXIoM 3.1 (Temporal  consistency):  For all t, y e Yt, z c Zt and x, x' EXt+,, 
(z, x) >y (z, x') at time  t if and only if x >(y,z)  x' at time  t +  1.6 
The motivation  for this key axiom  runs  as follows. Suppose  that at time t with 
payoff  history  y, the individual  has a choice  between  the two (degenerate)  actions 
4That  is, for each Yt  and d,, the sets {d' cE  D,:  d'  t  dt} and {d E Dt: d  t  dt}  are both closed (in 
the weak convergence topology). 
S If >Yt is extended to all subsets of D, by these definitions, then they are not equivalent. The latter 
yields a transitive but incomplete  binary relation, while the former yields a complete  and transitive 
ordering. Note also that the former does not yield indifference between a subset of D, and its closure. 
6 Alternatively: (z, x)  y  (z, x') if and only if for each d'  E x' there exists d E x such that d >(y,z)  d'. DYNAMIC  CHOICE  THEORY  191 
(z, x) and (z, x'), and he selects (z, x) (so that (z, x) > , (z, x')). Then the axiom 
requires  that when the payoff history  is (y, z), he cannot strictly  prefer x' to x. 
Doing so would make him "inconsistent"  in that he would "regret"  his earlier 
choice.  Similarly,  if at time t + 1 with  payoff  history  (y, z) he weakly  prefers  x to x', 
then he cannot  at time t strictly  prefer  (z, x') to (z, x) when  the history  is y. For in 
doing so, he is "inconsistent"  as he strictly  prefers  (z, x') although  it leads with 
certainty  to an immediate payoff identical to that of (z, x) and a subsequent 
decision  problem  which  at time t + 1 will not be viewed  as better.  (An alternative 
justification  for Axiom 3.1, more  consistent  with  the normative  approach  taken  in 
Section  4, will be given there.) 
A consequence  of Axiom 3.1 is that every relation > Yt  can be reconstructed 
from >Yo  as follows: If yt = (zo,.  . . , zt-1)e  Yt and x, x' E Xt are fixed, then x  Yt X' 
if and only if (zo, . . . , zt-1, x) >yo (zo, . . . , zt-1, x'). Axiom 3.1 also allows us to tie 
together  the functions  Uy,  provided  by Lemma  3 as follows. 
LEMMA  4: Axioms 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 3.1 are  necessary  and  sufficientfor  there  to 
exist  functions  Uy,  as in Lemma 3 and, for  fixed {  Uyt, unique  functions 
uyt  {(z, y) E Zt x R: y =  U(yt,z)(x) for some x E Xt+1}  -> R 
which  are strictly  increasing  in their  second  argument  and which  satisfy 
(1 )  Uy (z,  X) =-uy  (z,  U(y,Z)(X )) 
for allye  Yt,  zeZt,  and xeX+X1. 
PROOF:  Assume  that  the four  axioms  hold and  fix  the functions  Ut as  provided 
by Lemma 3. Equation (1) serves to define the uyt  uniquely if we show that 
U(Y  Z)(x)  = U(y,z)(x')  implies Uy  (z, x) = Uy  (z, x'). But this is a trivial consequence 
of Axiom 3.1. That uyt  is strictly  increasing  in its second argument  is similarly  an 
easy consequence  of Axiom 3.1. 
Conversely,  if functions  Uyt  and  uyt  with  the given  properties  exist,  then  Axioms 
2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 follow from  Lemma  3. And if for y E Yt,  z E Z, and x, x'eXt+1, 
x >(y,z)  x', then  U(y,Z)(x): U(y,z)(x')  and, by the monotonicity  of uy, U (z, x) = 
uy(z, U(y,z)(x)):  uy(z, U(y,z)(x'))  =  Uy(z,  x'), thus (z, x)  y  (z, x'). Repeating  the 
argument with  strict preferences and  strict inequalities, using the  strict 
monotonicity  of uy,  yields  Axiom 3.1.  Q.E.D. 
Alternative  (and  perhaps  clearer)  forms  of equation  (1) are 
(2)  Uy  (z, x) = uy  (z, max  Ed [  U(y,J)])  = max uy  (z, Ed [  U(y,z)]). 
The role played  by the functions  uy is clear  if we write 
u(z,  y) = Uy  (z, U(yz)(y)), 
where Axiom 3.1  guarantees that the choice of  x e U-1)(y)  can be made 
arbitrarily.  Thus  we see that  the uyt  act to "convert"  from  the utility  scale used at 192  D.  M.  KREPS  AND  E.  L.  PORTEUS 
time t + 1 to tne scale  used  at time t. As we shall  see, this  conversion  is not simply  a 
"renormalization"  but  must  involve  the attitude  of the individual  to the resolution 
of uncertainty  at time t vs. at time t + 1. 
Nothing  is said  in Lemma  4 about  the continuity  of the u,. In fact,  we can show 
that each uy is continuous  in its second argument.  But unless care is taken in 
specifying  the collection  {Uyj, continuity  of uy  in its first  argument  may  fail. The 
trick  is to pick Uy,  which are  continuous  not only in (zt,  x,+,) but  in (yt, zt,  x,+1)-if 
this  is done then the uyt  are  continuous  in (yt,  zt, y). As we are  about  to see, Axiom 
3.1 enables us to do this, thus enabling  us to give the following "continuous" 
version  of Lemma  4. 
THEOREM  1: Axioms 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 3.1 are  necessary  and  sufficientfor  there 
to exist a continuous  function U:  YT+j -- R and, for t = O,  .. ., T-  1, continuous 
functions  ut: Yt  x Zt  X R -  R, strictly  increasing  in their  third  argument,  so that  if we 
define UYT(ZT)  =  U(YT, ZT)  and, recursively, 
(3)  Uy,(zt,xt+i)=  max  ut(yt,zt,Ed[ U(y,,z,)]), 
d{ext+j 
then  forall yt  and d, d'E Dt, d >Yt  d' if and only if Ed[UY]  y  Ed,[  Uy,]. (That is, {Uy, 
satisfies  Lemma 3.) 
PROOF:  We only sketch the proof. Assuming  the four axioms, let Uy0  be as 
guaranteed  by Lemma 3. For each Yt,  there exist x' and x" in Xt such that 
x'>Ytx  t x"  for all xeXt.  Fix the version of  Uyt as in Lemma 3 so that 
Uyt(x')  =  Uy.(yt,  x')  and  Uyt(x") =  Uy.(yt, x").  (Use  Axiom  3.1  to  ensure  that 
xYt  [resp., >yt]  x" implies  Uy,(yt,  x') =  [resp., >]  Uy,(yt,  x").)  Show  that  for 
these {Uyt  , if yt(n)-  Yt  and  x-  xt, then Uyt(f,)(Xn)-_  Uyt(xt).  Now produce  {uyt}  as 
in Lemma 4,  and show that they are continuous in (yt,  xt, y).  Extend them 
arbitrarily  so that they are continuous  for all y e R. Then U(YT+1)  =  UYT(XT) and 
ut(yt,  xt, y) = uyt(x,  y) will satisfy the theorem. 
Conversely,  if we have U and ut  as described,  we can  apply  the necessity  half  of 
Lemma  4 once we show that the derived Uyt  are continuous  in (zt,  xt+i). This is 
easily done inductively.  Q.E.D. 
This is our basic  representation  theorem.  Notice that it explicitly  involves  only U 
and the functions ur-these  serve to define implicitly  the functions Uyt.  Our 
machinations  concerning  the continuity  of the ut were required  for the necessity 
half  of the theorem,  in order  to ensure  that  the Uyt  derived  from U and  the u, are 
continuous. 
To aid in understanding  this theorem,  it is helpful  to "solve"  a dynamic  choice 
problem. Consider the problem x0 depicted in Figure 1, where T= 1 and 
Zo=  = [0, 10], and an individual  whose choice behavior is represented  by 
U(zO, z1)  =  (z0  + z1)112  and u0(z0, y)  =  y2 (for y  - 0). Analysis  of this problem  is 
given in Figure 1. First, Uyl(z1)  = U(y1, z1) is computed for each "complete 
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2.236. After computing  each of these, EdJUYJ]  is computed  for each d1  E D1. For 
example,  Ed,(a)[U(3)I  =  (.6)(2.236)+(.4)(3.)=  2.542.  Similarly, Ed,(b)[U(3)]  = 
2.482. Thus  di1(a)  >  (3) di1(b)-at time 1, when  y, = (3) and  the individual  faces  the 
problem  x1(a),  he  chooses  action  d1(a).  And  therefore  U(3)(x1(a))= 
maxdex1(a) U(3)(d)=  2.542.  Now  we  can  use  equation  (3)  to  compute 
Uy0(3,  x1(a)) = uo(3, 2.542) = (2.542)2 = 6.462. This is done for each x1 eA  X1, with 
values obtained  as indicated.  Now Ed[ UyJ is computed  for each d E Do; we find 
E4o(a)[Uyo]  = 6.86 and  Ed0(b)[Uy0]  =  6.87. Thus do(b)  >yo do(a). At time 0, action 
do(b)  is taken. 
4.  TEMPORAL  RESOLUTION  OF  UNCERTAINTY  AND  TEMPORAL  LOTTERIES 
Consider  the dynamic  choice  problem  depicted  in Figure  2, which  corresponds 
to the following  story:  A fair  coin is to be flipped  and based  on the outcome, the 
individual  either receives payoffs  (zo, z1)  = (5, 0) or (5, 10). Since z0 = 5 in both 
cases,  it is feasible  to have  the coin  flipped  either  at t = 1 (which  is do(a))  or at t = 0 
(which  is do(b)).  This  individual  obeys the four  axioms  of Sections  2 and  3, and  his 
choice  behavior  is represented  by U and u0  as given  in the previous  example.  We 
calculate  E4(a)[Uyj] = 9.33 and  Edo(b)[UyoI  =  10, so he strictly  prefers  to have the 
coin flipped at t =0,  as shown in the figure. But suppose his choices were 
represented  by U as above and uo(zo,  'y)  =  y1/2 (for y >  0).  Then Eo(a)[UyJ]  = 
1.748 and E4(b)[Uyo]  =  1.732, and he strictly  prefers  to have the coin flipped  at 
t =  1. Obviously,  the four  axioms  have  not resulted  in von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility on the vector of payoffs, as any individual  whose choice behavior is 
representable  in that manner  will be indifferent  between do(a) and do(b). 
In order  to compare  our treatment  with  the payoff  vector  approach,  it is helpful 
to recast  our treatment  in a different  but equivalent  form. This equivalent  form 
resembles the payoff vector approach in which one  takes as primitive the 
individual's  preferences  on the space  of lotteries  of payoff  vectors,  and  from  these 
preferences  one induces  choices in dynamic  choice problems.  We define objects 
called temporal  lotteries  in which uncertainty  is "dated" by the time of  its 
(9.33)  (9.330)  (3.054)  0  (2.236) 
a  5{  . 
10 (3.873) 
(5.0)  (2.236) 
(10.0)  .5  d1b  0  (2.236) 
5  F  (15.0)  2. 
5  d  {  10  (3.873) 
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resolution. (Temporal  lotteries form a subset of the space of dynamic choice 
problems,  namely  dynamic  choice  problems  where  all choices  are trivial.  They  are 
depicted  by probability  trees.) Axioms are given for the individual's  preferences 
on the space of temporal  lotteries  and a representation  theorem  is proved.  Then 
we show  that  if choice  behavior  in dynamic  choice  problems  is induced  in a natural 
way from the individual's  preferences  on the space of temporal lotteries, the 
choice  behavior  obtained  satisfies  the four  axioms  of Sections  2 and  3. Conversely, 
if one takes  as primitive  dynamic  choice  behavior  as described  in Sections  2 and  3, 
then the induced  preferences  on the subspace  of temporal  lotteries satisfy the 
three axioms  of this section. 
Let D*=  DT  and, recursively,  let X?*  be the set of all singleton  subsets  of D*, 
and let D*  1  be the set of all Borel probability measures on Zt-1  X X*.  Elements of 
D*  and X?*  correspond  to decision trees (beginning,  respectively,  with time t 
chance  and  choice  nodes)  where  all choice  nodes  are  singleton.  If the choice  nodes 
were  suppressed,  elements  of D*  (and  X:) when  drawn  would  be probability  trees. 
The degenerate  choice nodes are not suppressed,  however,  so that  we are able to 
relate these objects with the previously defined actions and dynamic choice 
problems.  Clearly,  D* c Dt and X* c Xt. 
Next, let Pt(yt)  be the subset of D*  of decision  trees whose chance  nodes for 
times k =0,  1, . . . , t -1  are degenerate with immediate payoffs given by yt. 
Verbally,  do  e D*  is in P,(yt) (for some yt) if no uncertainty  resolves  in do before 
time t. An element of P,(yt) is denoted by pt  = (yt,  dt) where dt  e D*.  Note that if 
Yk(Yt) =  Yk for k -  t, then  Pk(Yk)  Pt,(yt).  Also, Po(yo) = D*0. 
DEFINITIONS: Elements  of D*  are called temporal  lotteries.  Elements  of P,(yt) 
(for any t and Y,)  are called temporal  lotteries  resolving  from  time  t. 
Examples  can be culled from Figure 2. Both do(a) and do(b) are in D*  and 
d1(a), d1(b),  and  d1(c)  are in D*. In do(a), there  is no uncertainty  until  time t = 1 
and the first  payoff  is 5, so do(a)eP1(5). Also, do(a) can be written  (5, d1(a)). In 
do(b), there is no uncertainty  concerning  zo but do(b)M  P1(5) because there is 
uncertainty  which  is resolved  at time 0 concerning  x1. 
The space  Po(yo) = D*  is a mixture  space; if p and  p' are in D*  and a e [0, 1], 
then (a; p, p') is in D*.  But suppose  p and  p' are also in Pt(yt)  for some Yt.  Write 
P = (yt,  dt) and p' = (yt,  d') for dt, d  eE  D*.  For a e [0, 1], we have (a; dt,  d') is in 
D,  thus (yt,  (a; dt,  d')) is in Pt(yt).  Note carefully  the difference-(a;  p, p') is p 
and  p' "mixed  at time  0", while  (yt,  (a; dt,  d ))  is  p and  p' "mixed  at time  t". A final 
bit of notation:  For  p and  p' in P,(yt),  a e [0, 1] and k -  t, let (k, a; p, p') denote p 
and  p  "mixed  at time k" (which  is in Pk(Yk(Yt))).  In this  new notation,  (a; p, p') is 
denoted  by (0, a; p, p'). Of course,  (t, a; p, p') does not make sense unless  both  p 
and  p' are in Pt(yt)  for some Yt. 
For example, two elements of P1(5) are p(a) = (5, 0) (zo= 5 and z1 = 0, both 
with certainty)  and p(b) = (5, 10). We can construct  (1, .5; p(a), p(b)) which is 
do(a)  and  (0, .5; p (a), p (b)) = do(b)  in Figure  2. The only  difference  between  do(a) 
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Taken  as primitive  in this  approach  is a binary  relation  on Do which  represents 
the individual's  (weak) preferences  on D*.  It is denoted by >,  with >  and 
denoting the induced strict preference  and indifference  relations,  respectively. 
Three axioms  concerning  the relation  >  are posed. 
AxioM 4.1:  The  relation  >  is complete  and transitive  on D*. 
AxioM 4.2 (Continuity):  The  relation  >  is continuous  on D*. 
AxioM 4.3  (Temporal substitution): If  p,  p'e Pt(yt) satisfy p  >  p',  then 
(t, a; p, p")> (t, a; p', p")  for all a e (0, 1) and p"e Pt(yt). 
Axioms 4.1 and 4.2 are clearly  analogous  to Axioms 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. 
Axiom 4.3 is roughly  analogous  to Axiom 2.3, although  we shall  see that Axiom 
3.1 (temporal  consistency)  and Axiom 2.3 are needed to derive 4.3. We do not 
give a temporal  consistency  axiom in our second approach,  as we have only one 
binary  relation,  >, insteady  of a collection  of relations y,.7 
THEOREM  2: The  existence  of a relation >  on D* satisfying  Axioms 4.1, 4.2, 
and  4.3  is  necessary and sufficient  for  there to exist continuous  functions 
U*:  YT,+1oR andu*:  YtxZtR,-R  R(t=O,...,  T-1)such  that(i)each  ut*is 
strictly increasing in its third argument, and  (ii)  if one defines UY*:  ZT -,R  by 
UYT(ZT)  =  U* (YT,  ZT) and, recursively,  U*: Zt x Xt+ 1- R by 
(4)  LJ*yt(zt,  dt+  1) = u*  (yt, zt, Edt+  JyZ)) 
then for p = (yt,  dt) and p' = (yt,  d')  in Pt(yt), p >  p' if and only if 
Edt[U*]  U 
Edj  UytJ. 
PROOF:  The proof  is obtained  by mimicking  the proofs  of Lemmas  3 and  4 and 
Theorem  1. Note that Axiom 4.3 acts as the usual  substitution  principle  on each 
pt(yt)  taken  separately,  allowing  us to construct  the functions  U*.  Q.E.D. 
Given a relation  > on D* which  satisfies  Axioms 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, we are able 
to use the representation  given by Theorem 2 to induce choice behavior in 
dynamic  choice  problems  which  satisfies  Axioms  2.1,2.2,2.3,  and  3.1 as  follows. 
COROLLARY  1: Given  a relation  > on  D* which  satisfies  Axioms 4.1, 4.2, and 
4.3  and functions  U*  and  ut*  representing >  in the sense of  Theorem 2, define 
UYT:  ZT -- R by UYT,(ZT)  =  U*(YT, ZT),  and, recursively, define Uyt: Zt x Xt+1 -,  R 
by 
(5)  Uyt (zt  xt+)  =  max  u1  U(yt,  zt, Ed[U(yt,zt)]). 
dr=xt+l 
7 Alternatively,  we could  begin  with  relations  >Yt on D* and  include  a "consistency"  axiom  of the 
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If binary  relations  >,  on D, are  defined  by d  Yt  dyd if Edj[ UyJ]  >  Ed,[ Uyj, then  the 
collection  {>Yt} satisfies  Axioms 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 3.1. Furthermore,  the relations 
>Yt  defined  by  equation  (5) are  determined  by > and do not  otherwise  depend  on the 
particular  functions U* and u * used to represent >.  Finally,  >yo restricted  to D* 
coincides with >. 
PROOF:  That  Yt satisfies Axioms 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 3.1 follows from the 
necessity  half of Theorem  1. A straightforward  argument  by backward  induction 
yields  the last  two  statements.  Q.E.D. 
The following  is the converse  to Corollary  1. 
COROLLARY  2:  Given relations  >Yt on the sets Dt which  satisfy  Axioms 2.1, 
2.2, 2.3, and 3.1, if we let >  denote  the restriction  of >yo to D*, then >  satisfies 
Axioms 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. Furthermore,  if functions  U* and u  * represent  >  in the 
sense  of Theorem  2, and from U* and u  * we construct  functions  Uyt  via equation 
(5), then  the  functions  Uyt  represent  the relations yt in the  sense  of Theorem  1. 
The second part  of the corollary  can be rephrased  as follows:  The individual's 
preferences for temporal lotteries completely and unambiguously  specify his 
dynamic  choice behavior,  if that choice behavior  satisfies  the first  four axioms. 
PROOF:  Axioms 2.1 and 2.2 trivially  imply  Axioms 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. 
To show  Axiom 4.3, let p = (yt,  d), p' = (yt,  d'), and  p"  = (yt,  d")  be from  Pt(yt)  and 
let a E  (0, 1). If p >p',  then by Axiom 3.1 d >Yt d'. By Axiom 2.3, this yields 
(a;d,d")  >yt (a;  d',d")  and  so,  by  Axiom  3.1  again,  (t, a;p,p")= 
(yt,  (a; d, d"))  >  (yt,  (a; d', d"))  = (t, a; p', p"). For the second part, note that if 
functions  U and  ut  represent  the relations yt in the sense  of Theorem  1, then  they 
represent  > in the sense of Theorem  2. The second  part  of Corollary  1 therefore 
applies.  Q.E.D. 
Corollaries  1 and 2 establish  the equivalence  between the two treatments  we 
have  given (assuming  that  equation  (5) is used  to define  the relations yt  from  >). 
However, we feel that there is a significant  philosophical  difference  between 
them:  The treatment  of Sections  1, 2, and 3 is felt to be descriptive  in comparison 
with the normative approach of taking preferences on D*  as primitive. In 
particular,  compare  the roles played by Axiom 3.1 in the first  treatment  and by 
equation (5) in the second. From a normative  point of view, the individual's 
preferences  for dynamic  choice  problems  should  be derived  from  the "prospects" 
for future payoffs that the problems represent according  to the individual's 
preferences  for temporal  lotteries.8  Equation  (5) is explicitly  this derivation.  But 
in a descriptive  theory,  one's choices  at the various  times  for lotteries  on Zt x Xt+1 
8 In this  normative  approach,  it seems  natural  to begin  with  a single,  perforce  consistent,  preference 
relation on the space of temporal lotteries, although this rules out consideration  of changing 
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are  the primitive  data.  One might  interpret  Axiom 3.1, as saying  that  the revealed 
"value"  that the individual  attaches  to the xt is derived  from  the "prospects"  for 
future  payoffs  that the x, entail. But we prefer  to view Axiom 3.1 as saying  only 
that revealed choice behavior  at different  times is consistent,  without attaching 
this sort of normative  meaning  to it. 
Comparisons  with the payoff  vector  approach  are most easily  made  by examin- 
ing our second treatment.  The fundamental  difference  is in the (often implicit) 
"reduction  of compound  lotteries"  assumption  in the payoff  vector approach.  In 
many treatments (e.g., Herstein and Milnor [21), the space from which the 
individual  is choosing  is the space of lotteries  on YT+1,  so a compound  lottery  is 
identified  implicitly  by the simple lottery that it reduces to, no matter  when its 
uncertainty  resolves.  In other  treatments  (e.g., Raiff  a [7]), this  is made  explicit  (in 
Raiffa, it  is derived from his "Fundamental  Observation")-the  individual 
chooses from among  compound  lotteries  but is indifferent  between a compound 
lottery  and  the simple  lottery  that  it reduces  to. But in our treatment,  the space  of 
objects being chosen from is the space of temporal lotteries. There is a well 
defined  notion  of the time at which  uncertainty  resolves,  and  although  there  is an 
implicit  "reduction  of compound  lotteries"  axiom  for uncertainty  that  resolves  at 
a single time, there is no axiom which says or implies that uncertainties  at two 
different  times are equivalent  or can be "reduced".  Instead,  if p and  p' are from 
P,(y,) for some t >  1 and  some ye,  the individual  distinguishes  between (t,  a; p, p') 
and  (t -1,  a; p, p'), saying  that  the uncertainty  resolves  one period  later  in the first 
than in the second, and he may thereupon  prefer  one to the other. 
5.  PREFERENCES  FOR  EARLIER  OR  LATER  RESOLUTION  OF  UNCERTAINTY 
In this section, we give the consequences  for our representation  of assuming 
that the individual  prefers  earlier  resolution  of uncertainty  to later or vice versa. 
Also, we give the additional  necessary  condition  to reduce  our treatment  to the 
payoff vector approach-that when uncertainty  resolves is unimportant  to the 
individual. 
THEOREM  3.  Suppose  the individual's  choice  behavior  obeys  Axioms 2.1, 2.2, 
2.3, and 3.1 and, as guaranteed  by Theorem  1, his  choice  behavior  is represented  by 
functions  U  and  u,. Construct { Uy}  and, for each  t, Yt, and  zt, let [(yt,  Zt) 
{I E  R: y = U(Yt,Zt)(xt+l)  for some xt+1  E Xt+1}.  (The  set  r(y  zt)  is the  set  of values  y 
which are "  relevant" for ut(yt, Zt  ).)  Then for fixed t < T, yt, and zt, 
(t,  a; p,  p')  >  [resp., <,,  (+ 1,a; p,p') 
for all a E [0, 1], and p, p' E  P,+1(yt,  zt) if and only if ut(yt,  zt,  y) is convex [resp., 
concave, ajfine] in y for all y E  F(yt,  Zt). 
PROOF: Fix t, ye, and zt, and let  y,  y' E  r(yt, zt) with  y =  U(y  ,zJ)(d) and y' = 
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assumed.) Let p =  (yt,  zt, d) and p' = (yt,  zt, d'). Then for a E [0, 1], 
(t, (x; p, p') > (t + 1, (x;  p, p')  if and only if 
U, ((a;  (zt, d), (zt, d'))) :  U, (zt, (a; d, d'))  if and only if 
a UY,(zt, d) + (1  -  a)U,  (zt, d')  - Uy,(zt, (a; d, d'))  if and only if 
aut  (yt, zt,  y)  +(1  -a)ut(yt,  zt,  y':  )ut  (yt,  zt,  ay+  (1  -) a)y 
Repeating  this  argument  for < and - gives  the result.  Q.E.D. 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for Ut(yt,  zt,  y) to be strictly convex or 
concave for y E r(yt,  zt)  are easy extensions  of these results and are left to the 
reader.  Also, it is possible  to combine  this  notion  of preference  for earlier  or later 
resolution  of uncertainty  with the standard  notions  of risk averse  or risk  seeking 
preferences  to obtain  results  such as: If the individual  is risk averse  for lotteries 
resolving  entirely  at time 0 and  if he prefers  earlier  resolution  of uncertainty,  then 
he is risk  averse  for lotteries  which  resolve  at any  time. (Results  of this  sort  will be 
given in subsequent  work.) 
Returning  momentarily  to the example  at the beginning  of Section  4, we can  see 
Theorem 3 at work. If uo(zo,  -y)  =  y2 (for yy - 0), then uo is convex and so, as 
verified computationally,  the individual  prefers that the coin flip take place at 
t = 0. But if uo(zo, y) =  y11/2,  U0  is concave,  and he prefers  the flip at t = 1. 
If we assume  that the timing  of resolution  is inconsequential  to the individual, 
we obtain the payoff  vector approach. 
AxioM 5.1: For  all  t ?1,  Yt, ae[O,1]  and  p,  p'E Pt(yt), (t,a;p,p')- 
(t-  1, a; p, p').9 
COROLLARY  3: Axioms 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, and 5.1 are  necessary  and sufficient 
for the individual's choices to be representable  by a  single (von Neumann- 
Morgenstern)  utility  function  Uon YT+1,  by  which  we  mean:  In the  representation  of 
Theorem  1, we can take ut(yt,  zt, -y)  =y  for all t, Yt,  and zt. 
PROOF:  We can select U and ut in Theorem 1 so that for the induced Uy, 
Uy,(x) =  U,0(yt,  x') and Uy,(xt)  = UyJ(yt,  x'")  where x' and x'"  may depend on Yt 
and x' >  x't unless >Y  is void. (See the proof of Theorem 1.) But then for all xt, 
Uyt(xt)  =  Uy0(yt,  xt), because Theorem 3 and Axiom 5.1 yield that Uy0(yt,  ) 
is a (positive) affine transformation  of  U,,(  ), and they agree at two distinct 
values (except  in the trivial  case, for which  the proof is obvious).  And as ut must 
satisfy ut(yt,  zt, U(yts,t)(xt+l)) =  Uyt(zt, xt+),  we  have  ut(yt,  zt, Uyo(yt, zt,  xt+i))= 
Uyo(yt, zt, xt+i),  or ut(yt,  zt, y) = y. 
The necessity  half  is a trivial  consequence  of Theorem  3.  Q.E.D. 
6.  PAYOFF  HISTORY  INDEPENDENCE 
In this section we consider  the consequences  of assuming  that the individual's 
choices at time t are independent  of past payoffs. 
9 It suffices to have the stated property for only the most and least preferred elements  of P1(y,), 
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AXIOM  6.1: Ifd,d'eD,satisfyd  >  ,d'forsomey, thend >  d'forally  e Yt. 
COROLLARY  4: Axioms  2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, and 6.1 are  necessary  and sufficient 
for  there  to  exist  continuous  functions  U: ZT -  R  and  u,: Z, x R -> R 
(t = O,  ... ., T-  1) such that the u, are strictly  increasing  in their  second  argument 
and, if we define UT: ZT-OR by UT-U  and, recursively,  Ut: Z, X  X,+l -* R by 
U,(z, x) =  maXdEX  u,(z,  Ed[Ut,+1]),  then  ford, d' E  D, d >Yt d' for all y, if and only if 
Ed  [ Ut] I ?' Ed  [ Ut I 
PROOF: Suppose the five axioms hold. Arbitrarily  select y+e YT  and let 
yt = Yt  (Y  T). Obtain U': YT+l  -  R  and u :  Yt x Zt x R  -  R  as in Theorem 1. Set 
U(ZT)=  U'(Y'T,  ZT)  and  ut(zt, y)=  ut(y,  zt, y).  Then  inductively,  Ut(z,  xt+1)= 
U'y  (zt,  xt+1).  Applying Axiom 6.1 gives the result. The necessity  half is trivial. 
Q.E.D. 
Of course,  we cannot  combine  Corollaries  3 and  4 to say that if Axioms 2.1, 2.2, 
2.3, 3.1, 5.1, and  6.1 all hold, then the individual's  choices  can  be represented  by 
U: ZT -  R  and  ut: Zt x R -> R  where  ut(zt, y) =  y.  Each  proof  required  that 
particular  versions  of the Uy,  be selected, and these versions  may differ.  Instead, 
we have  the well known  result  for separable  cardinal  utility:  If all the axioms  hold, 
choices can be represented  by U: ZT -- R  and ut: Zt x R -> R  where ut(zt, y) - 
at(zt)  + bt(zt)  y, for bt(zt)  > 0. 
7.  DISCUSSION 
The feature  that  most  clearly  distinguishes  our  treatment  from  previous  work  is 
its focus on the temporal  aspect  of uncertainty.  Our approach  to dynamic  choice 
problems  and temporal  lotteries  explicitly  models  uncertainty  as "attached"  to a 
certain time. Although reduction  of compound  uncertainty  at a single time is 
implicit,  reduction  of uncertainty  at several different  times is not allowed. Our 
treatment  is no more nor less than an application  of standard  cardinal  utility 
theory  to this  expanded  conception  of a "mixture  space".  (Note that  if attention  is 
restricted  to choice  problems/temporal  lotteries  where  all uncertainty  resolves  at 
t = 0, there  is a single  "mixing"  of prizes  and  one gets the  payoff  vector  approach.) 
It is this temporal  character  of uncertainty  which  has led to our results  and not 
"temporal  inconsistency"  (in the sense of Hammond  [31  or Peleg and Yaari  [6]). 
This  is clear  from  Theorem  2 and  Corollary  1, where  we show  that  our axioms  are 
equivalent  to the supposition  of a single  (perforce  consistent)  preference  relation, 
albeit  on the larger  domain  of temporal  lotteries.  It is possible,  however,  to give 
analyses  of "inconsistent  choice behavior"  in the spirit  of the cited papers, by 
relaxing  Axiom 3.1. (Equivalently,  one can posit for each t and yt preference 
relations Yt  on De  which  are  not consistent  and  legislate,  in place  of equation  (5), 
"naive"  or "sophisticated"  choice behavior.  In either  approach,  the troublesome 
issue of "ties" for sophisticated  choice comes up exactly as in the analyses  of 
inconsistent  choice behavior  under  certainty.) 
We conclude with two technical points. The assumptions  that each Zt  is 200  D.  M.  KREPS  AND  E.  L.  PORTE  US 
compact and that choices/preferences  are continuous are more necessary  for 
mathematical  reasons  than may be apparent.  If ZT,  say, is not compact,  then DT 
will be Polish but also not compact  and  XT  as topologized  will not be separable. 
And if >YT  is not continuous,  then  we cannot  even partially  justify  looking  only at 
closed subsets  of DT  in forming  XT,  so that topologizing  XT  is difficult.  Relaxing 
either  or both of these assumptions  is not fatal,  but the required  constructions  are 
much  more involved. 
Stanford  University 
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